Wright Development, Inc. v. The City of Wellsville : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Wright Development, Inc. v. The City of Wellsville :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
W. Scott Barrett; Attorney for Appellant;
L. Brent Hoggan; Attorney for Appellee;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Wright Development, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, No. 16531 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1800
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UUB'. 





THE CITY OF WELLSVILLE, 





Appeal from an Order Dismissing Plaintiff's ActioR 
Refusing Declaratory Relief 
In the District Court of the First Judicial District 
In and For Cache County, Utah 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Judge 
L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
W. Scott Barrett 
BARRETT & MATHEWS 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
FILED 
AUG 13 1979 
-------·-·············--------·-··--
[Cierlr, Supreme c-t, Utoh 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE JF UTAH 





THE CITY OF WELLSVILLE, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellee. 
Civil No. 16531 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from an Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Action and 
Refusing Declaratory Relief 
In the District Court of the First Judicial D~strict 
In and For Cache County, Utah 
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Judge 
L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 8432l 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
W. Scott Barrett 
BARRETT & MATHEWS 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE ..... 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
AUGUMENT. 
POINT I: 
SINCE THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS DISMISSED AT 
THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PRESENTATION OF 







IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF . • . 7 
POINT II: 
APPROVAL OF A FINAL PLAT IS A MINISTERIAL ACT 
AND THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT 
CITY COULD IMPOSE NEW AND ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS 
AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION AFTER APPROVAL OF A 
PRELIMINARY PLAT . . . . . • . . . • • • . • . 8 
POINT III: 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF DECLAR-
ATORY RELIEF DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT IT IS 
UNREASONABLE AND ARBITRARY FOR DEFENDANT TO RE-
QUIRE, AS A CONDITION OF FINAL PLAT APPROVAL, 
AN 8" WATER LINE COMMENCING 1.5 MILES FROM THE 
SUBDIVISION PROPERTY ENTIRELY AT PLAINTIFF-
DEVELOPER'S EXPENSE. . . . . . . . . • . • . • 10 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV: 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) , 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT 
MUCH BROADER THAN THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED 
AND ERRED IN FAILING TO AMEND SAID FINDINGS 
AFTER OBJECTIONS BY THE PLAINTIFF • • • . • 13 
CONCLUSION • . • • . 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Connecticut River Estates Inc. vs. Luchsinger 
276 NYS 2d 389 (1967) . . . . . • • . 9 
Dailey Constructions vs. Planning Board of Randolph 
340 MASS 149, 163 N.E. 2d 27 (1959) ll 
Greenlawn Memoraial Park vs. Neenah Town Board of 
Supervisors 
270 WIS 378, 71 N.W. 2d 403 (1955). 9 
J.C. Penney's Properties vs. Oak Lawn 
38 ILL APP 3d 1016, 349 N.E. 2d 637 0976). 9 
Lake Intervale Homes vs. Troy Hills 
28 NJ 423, 147 A 2d 28 (1958) . 
Leven vs. Livingston Township 
35 NJ 500, 173 A 2d 391 (1961). 
Pearson - Kent Corporation vs. Bear 






Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
75 AM JUR 2d 471 
75 AM JUR 2d 473 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
( Contin.ued) 
TEXTS AND TREATISES 











Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURY OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





THE CITY OF WELLSVILLE, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellee. 
Civil No. 16531 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Wright Development, Inc., for 
Mandamus and Declaratory Relief against the City of Wells-
ville concerning Wellsville's refusal to approve a Final 
Subdivision Plat. The Complaint was filed on December 21, 
1978 and an Amended Complaint stating a claim for Declara-
tory Relief was thereafter filed. The City of Wellsville 
answered the Complaint and the Amended Complaint generally 
denying Plaintiff's allegations. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court, the Honorable 'veNoy Christoffersen, Dis-
trict Judge, heard the Plaintiff's case on the 2nd day of 
March, 1979. Defendant presented no evidence but Moved to 
Dismiss the Plaintiff's action (TR 40). The Court thereupon 
took the Motion under advisement (TR 49) and asked the 
parties to submit Memoranda of Law on the Motion to Dismiss. 
Without taking any further evidence, the Court rendered its 
Decision on April 2, 1979. The Decision granted the Motion 
to Dismiss on the sole ground that the Defendant's action in 
refusing to consider or approve the final plat was discre-
tionary. The Court did not consider or rule on Plaintiff's 
Request for Declaratory Relief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests that the Court reverse the Order of 
the lower court dismissing Appellant's action and that the 
relief prayed for by Appellant be granted or that the matter 
be remanded for further proceedings including a decision on 
Appellant's Request for Declaratory Relief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Over three years ago the Plaintiff, through Robert Wright, 
its President, traded certain real property with the under-
standing that the property he received would be annexed into 
the City of Wellsville and zoned tor subdivision develop~ 
men~. (TR 6-7) The property was annexed by Wellsville and 
zoned for single family subdivision development. Thereafter, 
a Preliminary Plat was prepared and approved by the City of 
Wellsville (TR 7). Conditions for the approval were set 
forth in a letter signed by the City Engineer, dated 23 
September 1977 (PL. EX. 2) (TR 8-9). 
Between the time the Prelimi~ary Plat was approved and a 
Final Plat was submitted to the City for a twenty-one (21) 
lot partial subdivision, Valley Engineering Company, which 
had represented the Plaintiff, accepted employment as the 
Wellsville City Engineer and told Plaintiff it could no 
longer represent the Plaintiff's interests (TR 14). 
It appeared from the evidence presented at the trial that 
the primary reason for the City Ccuncil of the Defendant 
refusing to approve the Final Plat as submitted was that the 
City Council required a substantial change from the Prelim-
inary Plat. The Preliminary Plat provided for a Six Inch 
(6") water line to the nearest city water main. However, 
the City Council, as a condition for approval of the Final 
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Plat, attempted to impose an obligation on the part of the 
Plaintiff to construct an Eight Inch' (8") water line One and 
One-Half (1.5) Miles from the subdivision. This would cost 
approximately Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00) (TR 14-
15). In addition to that, the City would charge the devel-
oper Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) for each hook-up 
to the water line it was trying to require the developer to 
install at his own expense, and would permit hook-ups outside 
the subdivision to other users with no credit or benefit to 
the developer. 
After approval of the Preliminary Plat, Plaintiff's repre-
sentatives appeared before the Defendant City Council numerous 
times trying to get a Final Plat approved (TR 29-30). 
During those conferences, the only objection the Defendant 
City Council made to the approval of the Final Plat was the 
provision for supplying city water. Rather than the 6" line 
to the nearest city water main, as provided in the Prelim-
inary Plat, the City Council insisted on an 8" line running 
1.5 miles to be installed entirely at the developer's expense 
(TR 30-31). 
Numerous other minor objections to the Final Plat were 
raised for the first time by Defendant's counsel at the 
trial, such as waste water, access, title to the property, 
etc. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that any of 
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these minor items were material or prevented in any way the 
City's approval of the Final Plat. The 8" water line was 
the basic condition City wanted (TR 30), It further appeared 
that Plaintiff agreed to comply with all Defendant's require-
ments except the 8" water line (T~ 14, 15). 
The mayor of the Defendant City admitted that the basic 
reason for failure to approve the Final Plat was disagree-
ment on the 8" water line and who should pay for it (TR 37). 
This new requirement was recommended by Valley Engineering 
who had, after the approval of the Preliminary Plat, which 
they prepared, changed their employment from the developer 
to the City (TR 37-38). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
SINCE THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS DISMISSED AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE, 
ALL OF THE FACTS MUST BE INTERPRETEC IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
II 
APPROVAL OF A FINAL PLAT IS A MINISTERIAL ACT AND 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT CITY COULD 
IMPOSE NEW AND ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS AS A MATTER 
OF DISCRETION AFTER APPROVAL OF A PRELIMINARY PLAT. 
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III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF DECLARATORY 
RELIEF DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT IS IS UNREASONA-
BLE AND ARBITRARY FOR DEFENDANT TO REQUIRE, AS A 
CONDITION OF FINAL PLAT APPROVAL, AN 8" WATER LINE 
COMMENCING 1.5 MILES FROM THE SUBDIVISION PROPERTY 
ENTIRELY AT PLAINTIFF-DEVELOPER'S EXPENSE. 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT MUCH 
BROADER THAN THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED AND ERRED IN 
FAILING TO AMEND SAID FINDINGS AFTER OBJECTIONS 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
SINCE THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION WAS DISMISSED AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE, 
ALL OF THE FACTS MUST BE INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF. 
The Court's Dismissal of the Plaintiff's action pursuant to 
Rule 4l(b) is equivalent to a non-suit. The general rule 
for such a dismissal is that a motion for a non-suit admits 
the truth of the evidence and every inference of fact that 
can be legitimately drawn therefrom which is favorable to 
the Plaintiff. 75 AM JUR 2d 471. It has been further stated 
that "the evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff must be accepted 
as true and all conflicts and testimony must be resolved in 
his favor; the evidence must be interpreted most favorably 
to him and most strongly against the Defendant. Indeed, the 
Defendant's evidence may not be considered except insofar as 
it tends to clarify or explqin the evidence of the Plain-
tiff." 75 AM JUR 2d 473. 
A review of Plaintiff's evidence clearly establishes that 
the sole reason, whi~h had any weight at all, for the refusal 
of the Defendant to approve the Plaintiff's Final Plat was 
the insistence by the Defen~ant that Plaintiff install an 
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off-site water line beginning 1.5 miles from the subdivision 
at Plaintiff's expense. No evidence was presented on behalf 
of Defendant to show that such a water line was reasonable 
or necessary. Nor was any law submitted by Defendant's 
counsel to support Defendant's contention that such off-site 
improvements could be required under state law as a condition 
of final plat approval. 
The Defendant mayor admitted that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission had approved the Preliminary Plat and that they 
had also approved the Final Plat (TR 38). The mayor also 
admitted that the condition the Council wanted, that was the 
stumbling block, was the 8" line (TR 37). There is no evidence, 
except arguments of Defendant's counsel, that anything at 
all was in dispute other than the 8" line. 
II 
APPROVAL OF A FINAL PLAT IS A MINISTERIAL ACT AND 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT CITY COULD 
IMPOSE NEW AND ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS AS A MATTER 
OF DISCRETION AFTER APPROVAL OF A PRELIMINARY PLAT. 
As a general rule, it has been held that, if a subdivider 
complies with all of the requirements of the valid subdivi-
sion control laws, regulations, and ordinances, approval of 
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the final plat becomes a ministerial act and the plat may 
not be disapproved and especially not for reasons which have 
nothing to do with the intent and purpose of subdivision 
control. 82 AM JUR 2d 670. Where a developer complies with 
the zoning ordinance, the act of approving a plat is minis-
terial and can be enforced by mandamus. J.C. Penney's 
Properties vs. Oak Lawn, 38 ILL APP • 3d 1016, 349 N.E. 2d 
637 (1976) 
It has been said that "the intermediate step of submis-
sion of a preliminary plan usually is a local innovati0~ 
authorized by ordinance, but not specifically mentioned in 
the enabling legislation. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 
§23.13 This is true in Utah. However, whenever such proce-
dure is adopted, it constitutes a delegation of the prelim-
inary plat approval to the planning and zoning board. This 
has been done in Wellsville. "Where a preliminary plan bas 
been approved, approval of the final plat has been described 
as a ministerial act" Greenlawn Memorial Park vs. Neenah 
Town Board of Supervisors, 270 WIS. 378, 71 N.W. 2d, 403 
(1955) Anderson, American Law of Zoning §23.13 "Where a 
planning board has given final approval to a plat, such 
approval may not be rescinded without new evidence and an 
additional hearing after notice". Connecticut River Estates 
Inc. vs. Luchsinger• 276 NYS 2d 389 (1967) 
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Since a subdivider is entitled to know the extent of his 
obligations at a reasonable stage in ~he proceedings, condi-
tions mandated by the reviewing agency may not be changed 
after tentative preliminary plat approval. Leven vs. Living-
ston Township, 35 NJ 500, 173 A 2d 391 (1961) Anderson, 
American Law of Zoning §23.24. 
III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT OF DECLARATORY 
RELIEF DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT IT IS UNREASONA-
BLE AND ARBITRARY FOR DEFENDANT TO REQUIRE, AS A 
CONDITION OF FINAL PLAT APPROVAL, AN 8" WATER LINE 
COMMENCING 1.5 MILES FROM THE SUBDIVISION PROPERTY 
ENTIRELY AT PLAINTIFF-DEVELOPER'S EXPENSE. 
Conditions which require the subdivider to improve land 
outside the plat in issue, or to contribute to the improve-
ment of such lan1, have been disapproved. While a developer 
may be r~quired to improve a street or highway shown on the 
plat submitted for approval, he may not be required to im-
prove a streeL or highway which is not shown on such a plat 
...... a subdivider may not be required to improve streets 
outside the subdivision as a condition of plat approval. 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning §~3.36. 
10 
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Subdivision enabling acts commonly authorize municipal-
ities to require a subdivider to.equip his subdivision with 
a drainage system, sanitary sewers, and water mains •••• The 
capital outlay involved in the installation of water mains, 
sewers, and drainage systems is so great that developers fre-
quencly have raised legal issues relating to the exaction of 
fees, the reasonableness of specific requirements, and even 
the authority of a particular municipality to require a 
developer to absorb the costs of such improvements. Anderson, 
American Law of Zoning §23.43. A new Jersey Court held unrea-
sonable a requirement that water mains be extended along an 
entire street to serve scattered lots without regard to the 
benefit conferred. Lake Intervale Homes vs. Troy Hills, 28 
NJ 423, 147 A 2d 28 (1958). Disapproval of a plat for failure 
to provide adequate facilities is not justified where the 
lack is in the water available to the site and not in the 
size or location of the pipes installed by the subdivider. 
Anderson, American Law of Zoning, §23.43; Dailey Construc-
tion vs. Planning Board of Randolph, 340 MASS, 149, 163 N,E. 
2d 27 (1959). A subdivider cannot be required to construct 
a drainage system after a plat has been approved without 
such a system. 
ll 
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There are numerous cases holding that a developer may 
not be required to improve streets or highways which are not 
shown on the subdivision plat. Anderson, American Law of 
Zoning, §23.36. In that same section, it is further stated: 
"A subdivider may be required, as a condition of plat appro-
val, to provide access to a subdivision from the north even 
though he had not planned to provide such access. However, 
he cannot be required to bear one-half of the expense of a 
culvert to be constructed outside the subdivision but on 
such access route. A subdivider may not be required to im-
prove streets outside the subdivision as condition of plat 
approval." 
In Pearson - Kent Corporation vs. Bear, 315 NYS 
2d 226, the Court held that subdivision plats submitted for 
approval were improperly disapproved on the ground that three 
roads which provided access to thr, property were outside the 
property and inadequate. There is no statutory provision 
empowering a town to req11ire impruJements on streets outside 
a subdivision map at the time a subdivision plat is submitted 
for approval. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, §23.36 
Defendant's contention that it can require off-site im-
provements at the expense of the developer appears to he based 
12 
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on §25 of its ordinance which provides, in part, that anyone 
within the City desiring to have water or sewer mains extended 
for their use must bear the entire expense. It is submitted 
that this ordinance is invalid and unenforceable and that 
the Court's decision should have included an answer to Plain-
tiff's Prayer for Declaratory Relief as to whether this ordi-
nance is, in fact, valid. The decision helps the developer 
not at all and completely blocks developer's use of the land 
unless developer complies with every demand of the Defendant 
City, whether valid or not. 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT MUCH 
BROADER THAN THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED AND ERRED IN 
FAILING TO AMEND SAID FINDINGS AFTER OBJECTIONS 
BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Court's Decision was only two pages long and, in 
substance, it only holds that the Court considers approval 
of the final plat a discretionary matter for the judgment 
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Based on that opinion, Defense counsel prepared Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which greatly expanded 
on the Court's opinion and recited in its Findings of Fact 
matters which were not proved and Conclusions of Law which 
were not really considered by the Court. For example, 
Finding number 12 says: "Said letter of September 23, 1977 
has not been accepted by Defendant". The only evider.~e is 
that said letter, written by the City Engineer, was attached 
to the Preliminary Plat at the request of the Panning Com-
mission which had previously approved the Plat (TR 25-26). 
The Court further found, as a Fact, that the "0efendant 
had, in effect, validly enacted subdivision and water ordi-
nances". Part of Plaintiff's contentions are that the appli-
cable ordinances are not all valid. The Court, in its opinion, 
said nothing about whether or not the city ordinances were 
valid and enforceable. Other ~bjections arP set forth in 
Plaintiff's Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on file in the record. 
v 
CONCLUSION 
It is well reco~nized that the formalizing of procedure 
for plat review by m11nicipalities has had a heavy impact up-
on the right to develop land. The effect of su,division 
14 
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control on rights in land is as direct and formidable as 
that of zoning regulations. The owner of land which must 
be subdivided before it is developed can be stopped in his 
tracks by a recalcitrant reviewing agency" Anderson, 
American Law of Zoning, §23.10. 
The Utah Enabling Act does not set any time limit on 
approval of either final or preliminary plats. This enables 
a municipality to cause interminable delay. This case is 
a good example of such a delay which, in effect, has com-
pletely blocked the development of Plaintiff's subdivision 
for the time being. 
The Court could have been of great assistance in re-
solving a dispute between the Plaintiff and Defendant by 
simply making a definitive Order for Declaratory Relief 
stating whether or not the Defendant could compel Plaintiff, 
pursuant to valid ordinances, to make extensive off-site 
improvements by way of an 8" water line commencing 1.5 miles 
from the subdivision. The Court's decision in dismissing 
the Plaintiff's action establishes no guidelines whatsoever 
but, on the other hand, appears to hold that no developer 
has any rights in Court since substantially everything 
a city council does is discretionary. 
It is submitted that this is not the law and it is 
15 
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respectfully requested that the Order of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
DATED this 9th day of August, 1979. 
16 
~~~ 
W. Scott Barrett 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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